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COMMENTS

POTENTIAL COMPETITION:
ANALYSIS OF AN ANTITRUST CASE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Prior to the 1950 amendments to section 7 of the Clayton Act, it was

generally believed that section 7 barred only the acquisition of stock of a
direct competitor.' Consequently, the development of the law governing
conglomerate mergers did not begin in earnest until the passage of the
Celler-Kefauver Amendment of 1950.2 This amendment made it plain

that section 7 applied not only to the merger of direct competitors, but to
vertical and conglomerate mergers as well. 3 Thus, the amendment of section 7 set the stage for the development of what has become known as the
4
potential competition doctiine.
Before proceeding directly to the potential competition doctrine, it
should first be observed that potential competition is but one of three
theories that have been developed to deal with the special problems of conglomerate mergers. 5 Either alone, or in conjunction with the loss of potential competition, the reciprocity 6 or entrenchment 7 theories have also been
1. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 313 & n.21 (1962).
2. Pub. L. No. 81-899 § 7, 64 Stat. 1125 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1946)).
3. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962).
4. Section 7 has been the primary tool of antimerger litigation. Although
some authors have suggested that § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act might
prove more effective, see Carstensen & Questal, The Use of Section 5 of the
FederalTrade CommissionAct to Attack Large Conglomerate Mergers, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 841 (1978), the courts have not as yet adopted such a view. See FTC
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 291 n.1 (4th Cir. 1977).
5. See generally Dunfee & Stern, PotentialCompetition Theory as anAntimerger Tool Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A DecisionalModel, 69 NW.
U.L. REV. 821 (1975).
6. Reciprocity is the willingness of one company to buy from another, conditioned upon the expectation that the other will make reciprocal purchases. In
the leading case of FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 595 (1965),
the Court held that "reciprocity in trading as a result of an acquisition violates
§ 7, if the probability of a lessening of competition is shown."
7. The basic concept of the entrenchment theory is that "an acquisition by
a firm with extraordinary resources might raise entry barriers in a particular industry by discouraging other potential entrants, or it might discourage competitive challenges from smaller rivals fearful of provoking the giant." Missouri
Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 865 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 883 (1974). For example, in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568
(1967), the Court held that Procter's acquisition of Clorox violated § 7. In doing
so, the Court expressed the fear that if Procter were permitted to acquire the
already dominant Clorox, the smaller firms in the market would become more
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the basis for prohibiting mergers which were essentially conglomerate in
nature. 8 This comment necessarily will consider only a portion of the
analysis of a conglomerate merger. Complete analysis may also require
consideration of the reciprocity or entrenchment theories and perhaps the
special failing company defense 9 as well. These, however, are matters outside the scope of this work and are mentioned here only as a caveat.
The origin of the potential competition theory is generally attributed
to United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.10 where the Supreme Court
found that the merger of two natural gas companies violated section 7 even
though they did not actually sell natural gas in the same geographic
markets. Since the decision in El Paso, the potential competition theory
has reached the Supreme Court in four other major cases" and has been
the subject of numerous lower court decisions.1 2 Yet in spite of the frequency with which the theory has been litigated, it is still a developing
concept, the boundaries of which are undergoing substantial evolution.
The purpose of this comment is to give an organized statement of the
present status of the potential competition theory and supply a framework
for analysis of the law and the facts of the given case. Occasional forays
into theory have been unavoidable, but for the most part economic theory
has been deferred to those whose credentials qualify them for such discussion. In an effort to provide meaningful and practical guidelines, substantial reliance has been placed upon lower court and Federal Trade Commission decisions.
The analysis of a potential competition case may be broken down into
three broad aspects: (1) defining the relevant markets; (2) determining
cautious in competing due to their fear of retaliation by Procter. The Court also
thought that it was probable Procter would become the price leader and that the

oligopoly would become more rigid. Id. at 578.
8.

The government has also advanced a fourth theory which, if accepted,

would prohibit mergers which tend to increase economic concentration in
general. So far, however, the courts have not accepted this expansive reading of
§ 7. See United States v. IT & T, 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970); United States
v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
9. Simply stated, the failing company doctrine permits a merger to escape

§ 7 prohibitions if it can be shown that (1) the acquired company faced a grave

probability of business failure and (2) the acquired company had no other
available purchasers whose merger with it would have had a less anticompetitive
effect. See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
10. 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
11. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974);
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378
U.S. 158 (1964).
12. For a comprehensive listing of all the significant conglomerate merger
cases, categorized on the basis of whether the government prevailed or lost, see
Bauer, Challenging Conglomerate Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act:
Today's Law and Tomorrow's Legislation, 58 B.U.L. REv. 199, 200-01 &,n.8
(1978).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/4
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whether the acquiring firm was a potential entrant into one or more of
those markets; and (3) evaluating whether the loss of the acquiring firm as
a potential entrant may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly.
II.

RELEVANT MARKET

The analysis of any section 7 problem begins with the determination of
the relevant markets. Section 7 proscribes acquisitions "where in any line
of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly."' s Consequently, "[d]etermination of the relevant product and geographic markets is a 'necessary predicate' to deciding whether a merger
'1 4
contravenes the Clayton Act.
Determination of the breadth of the relevant market has been the
decisive factor in several section 7 cases. 15 Typically, the Government (or
private plaintiff) will attempt to define the market as narrowly as possible
to take advantage of high levels of concentration which exist in such
markets. 16 In other cases, however, the Government has sought to define
the market broadly, thereby characterizing the merger as horizontal
rather than conglomerate. 7 The market definition has always been important since the breadth of the market affects the determination of the
legality of the acquisition. However, it has become even more significant
because of the possibility of limiting the Government's remedy to less-than-

13. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970) (emphasis supplied).
14. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 618
(1974).
15. See, e.g., The Budd Co., 86 F.T.C. 518, [1973-76 Transfer Binder]
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 20,998 (1975); Sterling Drug, Inc., 80 F.T.C. 477,
[1970-73 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 19,961 (1972).
16. For example, in United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637
(C.D. Cal. 1976), the Government challenged the acquisition of Byron Jackson,
Inc., by the Hughes Tool Company. In addition to claiming a loss of potential
competition in the overall "oil field pipe-handling tools" market, the Government
also charged that each tool constituted a relevant product submarket. In Missouri
Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on
othergrounds, 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974), the geographic market was narrowly defined as the metropolitan areas in which the acquired firm, Portland Cement, had plants or terminals.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Amsted Indus., 1974-2 Trade Cases (CCH)
75,208 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (government attempting to expand geographic
market); Sterling Drug, Inc., 80 F.T.C. 477, [1970-73 Transfer Binder] Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH)
19,961 (1972) (government advocating wide product
market). Obviously the defendants in these cases sought to avoid the rigorous
standard for horizontal mergers which has developed under United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). The Government may establish a
primafacie case by showing that the merger created a firm controlling an "undue"
share ofofthe
market
andof increased
concentration
"significantly."
Published
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complete divestiture.' The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Acts of 197619 may reduce the frequency in which the remedy of divestiture
is necessary, but the extent of the competitive overlap may still be a consideration in an action for a temporary injunction 20 or in formulating a
21
consent decree.
A.

GeographicMarket- "Section of the Country"

Determination of the relevant geographic market is a question of fact;
no hard and fast rules can be established whereby the practitioner can
determine with certainty what the proper market(s) should be. In the past
decade, however, the courts have dealt with the question on numerous
occasions and from these cases certain factors have emerged as considerations in delineating the geographic market. In light of the dearth of commentary on this subject, it will be treated briefly herein merely so that the
subsequent discussion of potential competition can be viewed, as it must,
with an awareness of the problems of defining the relevant market.
The statutory mandate is that a merger may not lawfully proceed
"where in any... section of the country, the effect ... may be substan-

tially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly." 22 The burden is
upon the Government to produce evidence of the relevant geographic

18. "[W]here the offending line or lines of commerce constitute a relatively
small proportion of the entire business of the acquired corporation, partial
divestiture may be appropriate if competition can be effectively restored in the
affected markets." Warner-Lambert Co., 87 F.T.C. 817, 899, [1973-76 Transfer
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,141 at 21,032 (1976). See also FTC v. Pepsi
Co., Inc., 477 F.2d 24, 29 n.8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414U.S. 876 (1973); United
States v. Reed Roller Bit Co., 274 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Okla. 1967). But see
Fruehauf Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,402 at 21,377 (1978); RSR
Corp., 88 F.T.C. 800, 893, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,252 at 21,156 (1976)
(presumption in favor of total divestiture).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976). The Act requires prior notice be given before
any substantial merger, and provides for a 30-day waiting period during which
time the government can bring a suit to enjoin the merger. For analysis of the Act
see Kintner, Griffin & Goldston, The Hart-Scott-RodinoAntitrust Improvements
Act of1976: An Analysis, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1977). Regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act appear in 43 Fed. Reg. 33450 (1978).
20. See FTC v. Pepsi Co., Inc., 477 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
876 (1973) (All Writs Act case). The defendant may also be able to legitimate the
merger by selling off the off-ending areas prior to merger. See FTC v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 299 (4th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 362 F. Supp. 240, 268-70 (D. Conn. 1973), aff'd, 418 U.S.
656 (1974).
21.

See Bird & Son, Inc., 87 F.T.C. 411, [1973-76 Transfer Binder] Trade

Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,077 (1976).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (emphasis supplied). "Without exception the
Court has treated 'section of the country' and 'relevant geographic market' as
identical ... "United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 620
(1974).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/4
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market'2 3 but it is well recognized that there is some degree of "fuzziness"
inherent in any section 7 geographic market.2 4 Consequently, although a
"metes and bounds" description cannot reasonably be required, 25 the
Government must come forward with evidence delineating the "rough ap26
proximation" of the geographic market.
Determination of the relevant geographic market actually involves two
concepts: (1) determination of the outermost boundaries of the geographic
area, and (2) designation of smaller "submarkets" within the overall territory. 27 Because these two concepts are often confused they will be dealt
with separately.
1.

Overall Market

The breadth with which the Government may define the geographic
market is sometimes outcome determinative. 28 Although a broad geographic market will benefit the defendant in most cases-hence the nation
as a whole is frequently stipulated as the outer boundary-occasionally the
Government will attempt to give an expansive definition to the geographic
market so as to cast what otherwise would have been a market extension
29
merger into a horizontal merger.
The outer boundary of the geographic market in potential competi-

tion cases is described in United States v. Marine Bancorporation,Inc.30 as
"the area in which the acquired firm is in actual, direct competition;" 3 1
i.e., "the area in which the goods or services at issue are marketed to a
significant degree by the acquired company." 32 According to this test, the
acquired company may do an insubstantial amount of business in the same
area as the acquiring company without the merger being treated as horizontal. Thus, in a companion case, the Court held that a statewide market
was inappropriate for the evaluation of a merger between two multibranch
banks doing business in various local markets throughout the state. 33
23. United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 669 (1974).
24. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 360 n.37
(1963). The fact that on the fringes on the geographic market there may be
substantial competition from firms outside the market does not destroy its validity.
25. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549 (1966).
26. United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 669 (1974).
27. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336 (1962).
28. See United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 666 (1974);
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States
v. Amsted Indus., 1974-2 Trade Cases 75,208 (N.D. Ill. 1974); United States v.
Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133, 169 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
29. See cases cited note 28 supra.
30. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
31. Id. at 622.
32. Id. at 621.
33. United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974). Actual
competition existed in four towns, but the banks agreed to divest themselves of
sufficient
branches
to eliminate
theScholarship
overlap.Repository,
Id. at 659.
Published
by University
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Despite evidence that the banks did compete on a broad geographical scale
for very large customers, the court concluded that the vast bulk of business
was local in nature. Accordingly, the Government could not legitimately
claim that the merger was horizontal merely because of a few far-flung accounts.
The question, therefore, is whether the Government's market description sweeps so broadly as to include areas where the acquired company
does not do a significant amount of business. This is a question of fact and
courts naturally differ in their approach. 34 It should be mentioned, however, that the courts have tended to be less analytical in cases which are
clearly not geographic market extension cases.3 5
2.

Geographic Submarkets

Defendants have argued from time to time that submarkets are inconsistent with the notion that an overall market exists.3 6 To a defendant it
seems unreasonable that the Government may have its cake and eat it too,
so-to-speak, by claiming that competition is both national and regional in
scope. Regardless of the merits of this argument, the law appears to be
well-settled that the Government may challenge a merger on the basis of
3 7
multiple geographic markets.
34. Compare United States v. Amsted Indus., 1974-2 Trade Cases 75,208
(N.D. Ill. 1974) with RSR Corp., 88 F.T.C. 800, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
21,252 (1976). In Amsted the court rejected the Government's claim that a
nation-wide market existed for "water pressure pipe." Despite evidence that both
companies occasionally made bids throughout the country, the court concluded
that distant sales were so unusual that neither company was a national conpetitor. In RSR, however, the commission found that a national market had been
proven even though sales outside areas contiguous to defendant's lead plants were
infrequent.
35. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); British Oxygen
Co., 86 F.T.C. 1241, [1973-76 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
21,063 (1975), rev'd on othergroundsand remandedsub nom. BOC Int'l, Ltd. v.
FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977); Kennecott Copper Corp., 78 F.T.C. 744 [197073 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 19,619 (1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 67
(10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974). In each of these cases the acquired firm operated facilities scattered throughout the country, each of which
competed in a small geographical area near the point of production because
transportation costs prevented competition from extending over large geographical areas. Nevertheless, the courts viewed the acquisitions in terms of their effect
upon the overall national market. Although such market definitions may be technically improper, the courts tend to lump these regional markets together as a
matter of convenience where there is little risk of distorting the competitive effects
of the merger.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439,456
(N.D. Cal. 1967).
37. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 621
n.20 (1974) (explaining Pabst); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 571
(1967); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384U.S. 546 (1966); United States v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1967); United States v. Jos.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/4
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The general test for determining the validity of a geographic market
was first set out in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States. 38 "The geographic
market selected must ...both 'correspond to the commercial realities' of
the industry and be economically significant." 39 To be commercially realistic a submarket must be distinguishable from the overall market. 40 That
is, there must be a sufficient showing that there are significant barriers
which prevent companies within the overall market from entering the submarket as equally effective competitors. 41 Superficially this notion may
seem at odds with the finding that an overall market exists, but such is not
the case.
There are actually two reasons why it is conceptually possible to have
geographic submarkets: competition is measured from the point of view of
both the buyer and the seller; and because the overall market is not always
homogeneous, there may be room for differentiation within the market
even from the point of view of either buyers or sellers. The first of these two
concepts is clearly the easier to appreciate. Consider an industry such as
that of producing liquid laundry bleach where the cost of transportation
restricts effective competition to approximately a 300-mile radius around
each plant. 42 From a manufacturer's point of view, the market may be national in scope because the acquired firm has numerous plants and is "in
actual, direct competition" throughout the entire nation. 43 From a buyer's
point of view, however, the market is the area where he can reasonably
turn for supplies, i.e., those plants within 300 miles of his business. Therefore, there is an overall national market, and at least as many submarkets
as the acquired firm has plants.
The second situation in which submarkets may occur is more difficult
to understand, primarily because it is simply a question of degree. To
establish the outer boundaries of the market the court may include all the
areas where the acquired company markets its goods or services to a
Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 385
U.S. 37 (1966); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
38. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
39. Id. at 336-37.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Federal Co., 403 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Tenn.
1975). The parties stipulated that "southeastern United States" (10 states) was a
relevant market, but the Government attempted to show that within this market a
six state submarket existed. In rejecting the Government's claim the court stated:
[T]he record shows that there are no commercial factors which would
serve to distinguish the six-state area from the Southeast generally, and
that the factors which distinguish the Southeast from the rest of the
country exist throughout the Southeast.
Id. at 164.
41. See United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 558 (1966)

(Harlan, J., concurring).
42. These are basically the facts presented in FTC v. Procter &Gamble Co.,
386 U.S. 568 (1967).
43. See United States v. Grinnell Com., 384 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1963).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
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"significant degree."'44 Within this area, however, competitive conditions
may not be uniform. There may be certain areas within the overall market
where the acquired company has greater market strength than it generally
has throughout the larger market.
Assuming that holding a ten percent or larger market share is doing
business to a "significant degree," the acquired firm may have at least a ten
percent market share throughout the country, and the nation as a whole
will be viewed as the overall market. Notwithstanding that fact, there may
be certain areas of the country where, because of barriers to entry by other
firms, the acquired company has a substantially greater market share. For
example, a company which deals in bulk commodities might through the
use of rail transportation be capable of obtaining at least the minimum
market penetration required to be a significant competitor throughout the
Midwest. However, if one of its facilities is located on a waterway which,
because of inexpensive barge transportation, allows the company to compete more effectively, there may be a valid submarket consisting of the
markets on or near the waterway. In this case it is transportation costs
which are a barrier to firms outside the market and create a commercially
realistic submarket.
Transportation costs are not the only basis for distinguishing submarkets. For example, with products such as agricultural herbicides the
type of soil on which they are used has a substantial effect on their performance. Some perform better on light soils, while others must be used on
heavy soil. Therefore, in a merger between two completing herbicide
manufacturers, a geographic submarket might be defined in terms of soil
type. In this case, soil type might be a substantial barrier to entry into the
submarket.
Though the factors which might be considered in defining a geographic submarket are infinite, there are several major categories of factors which the courts have recognized:
45
(1) transportation costs;
46
(2) convenience and quick service;
(3) unique economic
and competitive conditions within the sub47
market:
44. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 621
(1974).
45. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 571 (1966); United
States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1967); United
States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129, 134 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd per
curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966).
46. See Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961);
United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. Cal. 1967); OKC,
77 ,F.T.C. 1342, [1970-73 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 19,369
(1970), aff'd, 455 F.2d 1159 (10th Cir. 1972).
47. See Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 817 (9th Cir. 1961);
United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1967);
United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd per
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/4
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(4) established consumer preference; 48 and
(5) industry or public recognition of the submarket as such. 49
Because the weight given each factor will vary according to its applicability
in a given case, no-one factor is determinative. Moreover, it is clearly not
necessary that all five factors be satisfied before a valid submarket is
shown. 50
In theory the burden is upon the Government to show that submarkets
conform to economic reality, but in practice the defendants who have prevailed on this issue have vigorously contested the Government's markets
through the use of economic data of their own. Generally, the defendant
desires to counter the Government's claim that its submarkets are valid
with evidence that no substantial barriers to competition exist; i.e., that
the submarket advocated by the Government is not shielded from competition from without. In several cases defendants have succeeded in doing just
that. While none of them appear to have negated all five factors, they
generally were able to convince the trier of fact that the submarkets designated by the Government did not follow the lines of significant economic
barriers and hence were invalid.5 1
Although the potential competition cases to date have seldom involved
disputes over geographic submarkets, 52 it may be presumed that the
Government will not ignore the submarket concept if a proper case arises.
As shall be discussed later, the Government must show that the industry is
concentrated and that the acquired company is a substantial competitor in
curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966).
48. See United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 558-61 (1966)
(Harlan, J., concurring); Department of Justice Merger Guidelines [1968], 1
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4510.
49. See United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439,457 (N.D.
Cal. 1967); United States v.Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal.
1966), aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966).
50. See, e.g., Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 817 (9th Cir.
1961) (convenience and service, common economic factors); FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 571 (1967) (court mentions only transportation costs).
51. See United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 1978-1 Trade Cases
62,063 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (frozen pies) (low transportation costs and national
uniformity in price, quality, ingredients and marketing); United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (paper products) (low
transportation costs plus evidence that paper manufacturers commonly compete
throughout nation); United States v. Federal Co., 403 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Tenn.
1975) (flour) (substantial sales from outside submarket, no distinct economic and
competitive conditions, and no industry recognition). Cf. Tampa Electric.Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (§ 3 case) (companies throughout the entire Appalachian area,, not just Florida, competed for utility's business).
52. It appears that only two potential competition cases have involved the
application of the submarket concept. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386
U.S. 568 (1967); Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 249
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 883 (1974).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979

9

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [1979], Art. 4
1979]

ANTITRUST AND POTENTIAL COMPETITION

467

the target market before the potential competition doctrine is applicable.

Accordingly, if the Government is unable to satisfy either of these requirements with reference to the overall market, it will have an incentive to
utilize the submarket concept. Thus far the cases have typically involved
dominant firms in highly concentrated overall markets and resort to submarkets has been unnecessary. Moreover, the Government is undoubtedly
reluctant to tackle the difficult problems of applying the submarket con5 3
cept to the potential competition doctrine.
B.

ProductMarket- "Line of Commerce"

In addition to the geographic dimensions of the market, the Government (or private plaintiff) must also establish the extent of the product
market. As in the case of the geographic market, the product market may
consist of an overall market, within which there may be one or more distinct submarkets- 4 Unlike the geographic market, however', there has
been considerable dispute in potential competition cases over the definition of the relevant product market. 55
In spite of the abundance of litigation, there still appears to be considerable confusion regarding the manner of determining the product
market. As with geographic market determination, the problem stems in
part from a failure to distinguish between the test for the outer boundaries
of the market and the test for submarkets therein. Once again, therefore,
the rules for defining the overall market shall be discussed separately from
53. Neither case cited in note 52 supra considered whether it must be proven
that the acquiring firm was a potential entrant as to each submarket. In Procter
& Gamble the acquiring firm clearly desired to become a national competitor;
hence it might be assumed that the de novo entry of Procter & Gamble would improve competition in the regional markets around the acquired firm's plants. In
MissouriPortland,however, there appeared to be no basis for assuming that the
acquiring company would have entered the four metropolitan markets considered by the trial court if the merger had been prohibited. It seems just as likely
that the acquiring company would have entered the market in an entirely different area. The courts may be presuming from the location of the company acquired that the acquiring company intends to enter the same area, a questionable
assumption.
54. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
55. See FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977); United
States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976); British Oxyen Co., 86 F.T.C. 1241, [1973-76 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
21,063 (1975), rev'd on othergroundsand remandedsub nom. BOG Int'l, Ltd.
v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977); Beatrice Foods Co., 86 F.T.C. 1, [1973-76
Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
20,944 (1975), modified, 540
F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1976); The Budd Co., 86 F.T.C. 518, [1973-76 Transfer
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) '20,998 (1975); Sterling Drug, Inc., 80 F.T.C.
477, [1970-73 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 19,961 (1972); The
Paper Craft Corp., 78 F.T.C. 1352, [1970-73 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 19,725 (1971), modified and aff'd, 472 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1973); The
Bendix Corp., 77 F.T.C. 731, [1970-73 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 19,228 (1970), vacated and remanded, 450 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1971).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/4
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the test for submarkets. It should be noted, however, that the Government
frequently prosecutes cases on the basis of a single submarket without
designating it as such. Whether the defendant can successfully expand the
a case will depend upon the
market advocated by the Government in such
56
rules governing the validity of submarkets.
1.

The Overall Market

In considering whether a product market advocated by the Government is too broad, the courts essentially attempt to determine if the Government's definition sweeps so broadly as to encompass a significant
number of products which lack any competitive relationship to one
another. For instance, in United States v. Ling-Temco Electric,Inc., 57 the
court rejected the "aerospace industry" as a relevant line of commerce. In
doing so the court stated:
The field includes such a broad range of heterogeneous products
and research activities that the "aerospace industry" is not an identifiable business activity which can be bound either in terms of
companies in the field or services performed or products manufactured. The concept of such an amorphous and nebulous field is of
no value in measuring the competition between Chance Vaught
and Ling-Temco. 5 8
Although Ling-Temco is an extreme example, it nevertheless clearly illustrates that the Government may not expand the product market indefinitely. If there were no limits upon the scope of the market, the potential
competition doctrine would inevitably be swallowed up for all practical
purposes by the horizontal theory of merger.
In determining the outer limits of the product market, the courts have
applied several theories, including cross-elasticity of demand, crosselasticity of supply, and cluster of products.59 If the product market advocated by the Government can fairly fit within any of these theories, the
market is not overly broad. Even though one test may suggest that a
56. See, e.g., Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 303, 308 (7th Cir. 1976).
Although defendant was correct in arguing that brushes, rollers, aerosols and
sprayers constitute a market, this was of no avail to defendant. The question was
whether the Commission could properly find that rollers and brushes alone properly constituted a line of commerce.
57. 1961 Trade Cases 70,160 (N.D. Tex. 1961). Cf. Warner-Lambert
Co., 87 F.T.C. 812, 865-67, [1973-76 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
21,141 at 21,014-15 (1976) (Commission questions validity of stipulated
markets, "all drugs" and "all ethical drugs"); Sterling Drug, Inc., 80 F.T.C. 477,
[1970-73 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 19,961 (1972) ("health and
beauty aids" not a relevant line of commerce).
58. 1961 Trade Cases at 78,643.
59. For a more extensive treatment of this subject see Rosenthal, Continental Can Revisited: Limits Upon the Breadth of a Line of Commerce in a Section 7
Case, 14 Hous. L. REV. 973 (1977).
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market is not valid, it may nevertheless be sustained on another; the tests
are not mutually exclusive.
a.

Cross-Elasticity of Demand

The cross-elasticity of demand test focuses upon the degree to which
consumers view various products as interchangeable. Under this test "[t]he
outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable
interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the
product itself and substitutes for it."60 The products need not be so interchangeable that they are fungible, 61 nor must the products be interchangeable in every segment of the proposed market. 62 As one court has
acknowledged, "[fjor every product, substitutes exist. But a relevant
market cannot meaningfully encompass that entire range. 63s Therefore,
whether there is sufficient cross-elasticity of demand is a question of
64
degree.
In applying this test courts have found metal containers to be reason66
ably interchangeable with glass containers; 65 beet sugar with cane sugar;
coal with natural gas, oil and uranium; 67 and cellophane with other "flexible packaging materials. '6 On the other hand, gas turbines are not
60. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
61. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 449 (1964) ("metal
and glass container" market).
62. Id. at 457. "There may be some end uses for which glass and metal do
not and could not compete, but complete interindustry competitive overlap need
not be shown."
63. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.31
(1952) (§ 2 Sherman), quoted in United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S.
441, 449 (1963) (§ 7 Clayton).
64. See United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441,449 (1964). "In
defining the product market between these extremes, we must recognize meaningful competition where it is found to exist." See generally Rosenthal, Continental CanRevisited: Limits Upon the Breadth of a Line of Commerce in a Section 7
Case, 14 Hous. L. REV. 973 (1977); Note, The Market: A Concept in Antitrust,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 580 (1954).
65. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
66. American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d
524, 529-30 (2d Cir. 1958) (court found that the two products were almost completely functionally interchangeable and that there was sensitivity to price
change).
67. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534, 555-56
(N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 486 (1974). The district court
concluded that the line of commerce for measuring the effect of the merger of a
deep-mine coal producer with a strip mine coal producer was the "energy
market." But see Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974) (coal is a valid market). GeneralDynamics is
particularly unusual because the court concluded not only that they may be combined, but that they must be combined.
68. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956)
(significant functional interchangeability and price sensitivity was shown).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/4
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reasonably interchangeable with steam generation systems for production
of electricity; 69 nor watchman services with central alarm systems; 70 nor
"family flour" with "ingredient flour," "durum flour," "baking flour" and
"millfeed." 7 '
In attempting to determine the reasonable interchangeability of one
product for another, "the factors that normally determine the choice or
preference of the user must be considered." 72 The threshold question is
whether the products are "functionally interchangeable," i.e., whether
they are reasonably adaptable to the same uses. 73 If so, it must next be
74
determined whether purchasers are willing to substitute one for another.
Price, quality, and consumer taste may prevent the substitution of one for
the other almost as surely as functional incompatability. Consequently,
although differences may exist, 76 a substantial number of users must be
willing to make a trade-off if price or quality vary within a reasonable
range.7 7 In most cases this element of reasonable interchangeability has
69. Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp.
1249 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
70. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
71. United States v. Federal Co., 403 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Tenn. 1975).
72. United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 246 F. Supp. 464, 468 (E.D.N.Y.
1965).
73. See United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); United States v.
Empire Gas Corp,, 537 F.2d 296, 303 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122
(1977); United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 246 F. Supp. 464, 468 (E.D.N.Y.
1965). See generally Note, Telex v. IBM: Defining the Relevant Market, 61 IOWA
L. REV. 184 (1975); Note, The Market: A Concept in Antitrust, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 580 (1954). As with the "reasonable interchangeability" test, in general
functional interchangeability is a question of degree. Fungibility is not required
nor must the products be functionally interchangeable for every purpose.
74. See authorities cited note 73 supra. See also Rosenthal, ContinentalCan
Revisited: Limits Upon the Breadth of a Line of Commerce in a Section 7 Case,
14 Hous. L. REV. 973, 1018-19 (1977) (cautioning that evidence of actual alternate purchasing should be a sine qua non of reasonable interchangeability).
75. See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 435 F.
Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ohio 1977). The court rejected plaintiff's "electrical generation equipment" market because gas turbines manufactured by U.T. were not
reasonably interchangeable with the steam generation systems produced by B &
W. Although both could produce the same end product (electricity), the cost of
operating gas turbines was prohibitive except for "peaking" operations.
76. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394
(1956).
77. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.31
(1953). Accord, United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 573-74 (1966).
There need not be short term shifting from one product to another based on
price. In United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964), the Court
found sufficient cross-elasticity between bottles and cans even though competition was largely based upon long term ability to interchange glass for metal. Accord, United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Ill.
1972), aff'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (court treated coal and other
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been established by proof of actual conduct. 78 Where proof of actual conduct is lacking, the courts are reluctant to rely upon what users theoret79
ically might do.
b.

Cross-Elasticity of Supply

The cross-elasticity of supply test is essentially the antithesis of the
cross-elasticity of demand theory. While the latter focuses upon what the
user may do, the former looks to the capabilities of the producer.8 0 In
Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co. ,"l the court stated:
Substitutability in production refers to the ability of firms in a
given line of commerce to turn their productive facilities toward
the production of commodities in another line because of similarities in technology between them. Where the degree of substitutability in production is high, cross-elasticities of supply will also be
high, and again the two commodities in question should be treated
82
as part of the same market.
The concept of cross-elasticity of supply is very similar to the theory of
potential competition. The difference is that cross-elasticity of supply
should require a much stronger showing of resource flexibility. A company
within a market encompassed by the cross-elasticity of supply concept
must be capable of switching its resources from the production of one
product to another within the immediate or near future. The potential
competition doctrine, however, embraces those firms which, although not
able to respond in the near future, possess actual or apparent capability to
do so in the future.8 3
Although the cross-elasticity of supply theory has received judicial
recognition in several cases,8 4 the Government has placed little emphasis
forms of energy as reasonably interchangeable despite obvious long term nature
of a decision to switch).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964);
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); American
Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
See generally Rosenthal, supra note 74.
79. See United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 303 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977). See alsp Rosenthal, supra note 74, at
1018-19.
80. Sea generally Rosenthal, supra note 74, at 996-1002.
81. 512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1975).
82. Id. at 1271.
83. See Sterling Drug, Inc., 80 F.T.C. 477, 583-95, [1970-73 Transfer
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 19,961 at 21,971-77 (1972); Narver, Supply
Space and Horizontality in Firms and Mergers, 1970 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 316
(spec. ed.).
84. ,See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 n.42 (1962);
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 446, 510-11 (1948); United States
v. Empire Gas Corp., 557 F.2d 296, 303 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1122 (1977); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 691
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/4
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on it. Indeed, Sterling Drug,Inc. 85 appears to be the only case in which the
Government has made a full-blown attempt to utilize the cross-elasticity of.
supply theory. The Government attempted to prove that the merger of
Sterling Drug, Inc., whose primary business was the manufacture of proprietary drugs, with Lehn & Fink Products Corp., whose primary business
was cosmetics and other beauty aids, was a horizontal merger. The market
advocated by the Government was a "health and beauty aids" market. In
support of this market definition the Government produced evidence of
similarity in advertising and distribution, but the Federal Trade Commission rejected the Government's definition because the Government had
failed to prove common production techniques and resources.
The high standard of resource flexibility required in Sterling may partially explain the Government's reluctance to rely on this theory. The
Commission correctly noted that the ability to switch from one product to
another requires flexibility in both production and marketing resources.
While a potential entrant will frequently have significant capability in one
of these areas, it is seldom the case that a high degree of resource flexibility
will be present in both. Therefore, courts should proceed with caution in
utilizing the cross-elasticity of supply concept, lest it be expanded to the
point that the potential competition concept is lost.
c.

Cluster of Products

The "cluster of products" approach is a concept which purportedly
supports broad market definitions which combine groups of non-interchangeable products into single lines of commerce. 8 6 For example, burglar
Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264, 1271 (9th Cir. 1975); Crown Zellerbach
Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 812-13 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937
(1962); United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637 (C.D. Cal. 1976);
Warner-Lambert Co., 87 F.T.C. 812, 865-67, [1973-76 Transfer Binder] Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,141 at 21,014-15 (1976); The Budd Co., 86 F.T.C. 518,
[1973-76 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 20,998 (1975); Sterling
Drug, Inc., 80 F.T.C. 477, [1970-73 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
19,961 (1972).
85. 80 F.T.C. 477, [1970-76 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
19,961 (1972).
86. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966) (various services constituted single "accredited central station alarm service"); United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (various services combined into
single "commercial banking" market); A.G. Spalding & Bros. Inc. v. FTC, 301
F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962) (athletic goods industry was a line of commerce); United
.States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (oil field pipe handling tools); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) (iron and steel industry is a line of commerce); Warner-Lambert Co., 87
F.T.C. 812, 865-67, [1973-76 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,141
at 20,014-15 (1976) ("all drugs" and "ethical drugs" markets questioned); British
Oxygen Co., 86 F.T.C. 1241, [1973-76 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
21,063 (1975), rev'd on other groundsand remandedsub nom. BOG Int'l, Ltd.
v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977) (all industrial gases).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [1979], Art. 4
1979]

ANTITRUST AND POTENTIAL COMPETITION

473

alarms, fire alarms, water overflow alarms, etc., have been grouped
together as a single central station alarm services market under the cluster
8 7
of products approach.
The cluster of products concept is particularly difficult to understand
because the courts have never articulated a test for determining what constitutes a "cluster of products." The only guidance offered by a leading
cluster of products case is that the cluster must reflect commercial realities. 8 Such a vague test is of course little help in analyzing the facts of other
cases.
Although a helpful test has not yet been articulated in any of the cases,
a recent Commission decision has noted several factors relevant to identifying a "cluster of products": 89 (1) all or substantially all of the significant
members of the industry provide all or substantially all of the services or
products within the cluster; (2) user preference for companies which do
supply the full range of products or services; (3) industry recognition of the
cluster of products as a distinct line of commerce;,(4) significant crosselasticity of supply between most of the products within the group; and (5)
intent on the part of the acquiring firm to engage in the full line of products. Of these five factors, however, only two have true economic significance - cross-elasticity of supply and consumer preference for a company
offering the entire mix. If there is sufficient cross-elasticity of supply, as
previously discussed, the various products may be lumped together. The
consumer preference aspect of the product cluster market is then used, not
to justify broadening the market, but to exclude other products which
would otherwise be includible in the cluster. 9a
When there is not a high degree of cross-elasticity of supply the doctrine becomes one of questionable economic merit,9 yet the courts appear
to rely on the other factors to justify a lesser degree of cross-elasticity of
87. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
88. Id. at 572.
89. British Oxygen Co., 86 F.T.C. 1241, [1973-76 Transfer Binder] Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,063 (1975), revd on other grounds and remanded sub
nom. BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977). See also United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). But see A. G. Spalding & Bros., Inc. v.
FTC, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F.
Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). In both of these older cases the court combined
numerous noninterchangeable products into a single line of commerce based
almost entirely on industry recognition. Neither case justifies its market definition under accepted economic principles.
90. In both United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966) and United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), the defendant was primarily concerned with the limiting aspect of the cluster of products doctrine. For
example, in PhiladelphiaNat'l, the defendant was chiefly concerned with the
fact that competition from non-commercial banks was not being considered. The
!umping together of the services into a single line of commerce was not the central
issue.

91. See Rosenthal, supra note 74, at 1019.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/4
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supply than was suggested in SterlingDrug, Inc. 92 In particular, the courts
appear to place considerable emphasis on whether most of the major producers within the industry produce the full line, or nearly the full line, of
products within the cluster.9 3 Where most companies within the industry
produce almost the entire line of products in the cluster, the courts apparently are willing to group the products into a single line of commerce even
though cross-elasticity of supply is not particularly high. 94 However, where
it does not appear that most firms in the industry produce substantially the
entire line of products, and cross-elasticity of supply is not particularly
high, there may be a greater reluctance to apply the doctrine.9 5
2.

Product Submarkets

As with the geographic submarket, the product submarket is a manipulative concept which greatly favors the Government. In general the
Government may subdivide the product market as it pleases so long as the
resulting submarkets are "economically significant. '9' 6 The defendant,
however, cannot insist that a narrower market be adopted unless the
Government has attempted to define the relevant market
more broadly
97
than permitted under the tests previously discussed.
92. 80 F.T.C. 477, [1970-76 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
19,961 (1972). For example, in British Oxygen Co., 86 F.T.C. 1241, [1973-76
Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,063 (1975), rev'd on other
grounds and remanded sub nom. BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.
1977), the Commission upheld a market composed of all industrial gases in spite
of the differences in technology and production facilities needed to produce
various gases. See also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966)
(Court does not expressly consider cross-elasticity of supply though it was probably relatively high).
93. In British Oxygen Co., 86 F.T.C. 1241, [1973-76 Transfer Binder]
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,063 (1975), rev'd on other grounds and remanded
sub nom. BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977), the Commission applied the cluster of products approach to industrial gases but did not apply it to
"inhalation anesthetic equipment and accessories" because, unlike industrial

gases, few companies made the complete line of products included in the cluster.
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966), also
emphasized that most companies provided the full line of services in the cluster.
94. See note 92 supra.
95. Cf. Warner-Lambert Co., 87 F.T.C. 812, 865-67, [1973-76 Transfer
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,141 at 20,014-15 (1976) (questioning the
propriety of the stipulated "all drugs" and "all ethical drugs" markets).
96. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). "[I]t is necessary to examine the effects of a merger in each economically significant submarket ..... Id. at 325 (emphasis supplied).
97. See, e.g., Beatrice Foods Co., 86 F.T.C. 1, [1973-76 Transfer Binder]
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 20,944 (1975), modified, 540 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1976).
In rejecting the defendants' attempt to narrow the market, the Commission
stated: "It may well be that paint brushes and paint rollers could be divided into
product submarkets according to quality-derived price distinctions. However, the
question presented by respondent is whether brushes and rollers must be segre-
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To determine whether a given submarket is "economically signifi-"
cant," Brown Shoe 98 states that the following "practical indicia" should be
considered:
(1) industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate
economic entity;
(2) the product's peculiar characteristics and uses;
(3) unique production facilities;
(4) distinct customers;,
(5) distinct prices;
(6) sensitivity to price changes; and
(7) specialized vendors. 99
Clearly the Government need not establish all of the above factors to prove
the existence of a valid submarket.100 Proof of as few as three of these factors has been held to be sufficient. 101 Conversely, however, the presence of
one or more of these factors does not necessarily mandate the finding of a
valid submarket. In several cases submarkets have been rejected even
02
where several of the indicia were present. 1
The question then is one of fact, and the courts have reached con3 All that can be said with
flicting results in nearly indistinguishable cases. 10
certainty is that while the Government has considerable discretion in
defining submarkets,104 the courts will not permit a market to be subdigated into entirely separate product markets....
20,786-87.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 56, (CCH) at

370 U.S. 294.
Id. at 325.
United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 739 (D.

Md. 1976).
101. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Public
recognition, distinct prices, and distinct customers were held to be sufficient to
distinguish florist foil from decorator foil. See also General Foods Corp. v. FTC,
386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968).
102. See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534
(N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd, 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (district court rejected coal as submarket of the energy market); The Budd Co., 86 F.T.C. 518, [1973-76 Transfer
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 20,998 (1975) (closed top and open top trailers
are not economically significant submarkets of all van trailers). See also United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (§ 2 case); United
States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 246 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) (§ 2 case).
103. Compare United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534
(N.D. Ill.
1972), aff'd, 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (coal is not a valid submarket of
energy market) with Kennecott Copper Corp., 78 F.T.C. 744, [1970-73 Transfer
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 19,619 (1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974) (coal is a valid submarket). Compare
United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 1978-1 Trade Cases 63,063 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (frozen pies and fresh pies are not proper submarkets) with United
States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 440 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (frozen pies are a
relevant submarket).
104. In Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 606,
617 (C.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd in partand remanded, 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976), the Court noted: "Reported cases have largely been
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/4
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vided to the point that commercial reality is ignored. Where a high degree
of elasticity of supply or demand exists between the alleged submarkets,
other "practical indicia" may be ignored and the submarkets rejected. 105
III.

THE POTENTIAL COMPETITION THEORY

Once the relevant markets are determined, the next step of the analysis is to determine whether the acquiring company is a potential entrant
into the overall market or any submarket thereof. 106 The potential competition theory must be applied to each and every relevant market to determine if the merger violates section 7. If the effect of the loss of potential
competition in any relevant market "may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly," 10 7 a section 7 violation exists.
However, as discussed previously, the extent of the violation may have a
bearing upon the consequences of such a finding. 108
The potential competition doctrine consists of two distinct theories:
the actual potential entrant theory and the perceived potential entrant
theory. 10 9 The perceived potential entrant theory is concerned with the
present effect that the potential competitor has upon the market place.
According to economic theory, if competitors within an oligopolistic

market recognize that a company outside the market is a likely entrant
they will keep prices and profits lower so as to discourage that company's
entry. 11 0 If the perceived potential entrant then acquires a substantial firm
limited to governmental concerns for the protection of competition where courts
have narrowed and broadened the product market without real criteria or consistency."
105. In Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961), for example, the court held that lake sand could not be distinguished from pit sand.
Although Erie is a pre-Brown Shoe case, the result would probably the same since
the court found almost perfect cross-elasticity of demand. See also The Budd Co.,
20,998
86 F.T.C. 518, [1973-76 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
(1975), where the Commission rejected the Government's proposed "open top
trailer" market because it found that there was an extremely high cross-elasticity
of supply between open and closed top trailers.
106. Although analysis normally focuses upon whether the acquiring company is a potential entrant into any relevant market where the acquired company
is a competitor, the doctrine is not so limited. The inverse situation may be
unlawful as well. See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S.
651 (1964). Moreover, if each is a potential entrant into the other's market, competition is hurt twice. Beatrice Foods Co., 67 F.T.C. 473, 720, [1965-67 Transfer
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 17,244 at 22,332 (1965).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
108. See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra.
109. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974);
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1972); BOC Int'l Ltd. v.
FTC, 557 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1977); FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d
289, 293 (4th Cir. 1977).
110. This so-called "limit-pricing" theory has not gone without criticism. See
Note, United States v. FalstaffBrewing Corporation:PotentialCompetitionReexamined, 72 MICH. L. REV. 837, 848-51 (1974). Nevertheless, judicial accep-

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979

19

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [1979], Art. 4

1979]

ANTITRUST AND POTENTIAL COMPETITION

477

already within the relevant market, the "edge effect," which formerly induced procompetitive behavior in the market place, is lost."1
The other theory, actual potential entry, deals with the loss of future
rather than present competition. As stated in United States v. MarineBancorporation,Inc. :112
[T]he [actual] potential-competition doctrine proscribes a . . .

merger solely on the ground that such a merger eliminates the
prospect for long term deconcentration of an oligopolistic market
that in theory might result if the acquiring firm were forbidden to
enter except through a de novo undertaking or through the acquisition of a small existing entrant (a so-called foothold or toe hold
acquisition)." s
Thus under the actual potential entrant theory, awareness of the potential
entrant is unnecessary. It is the prospect of a more procompetitive form of
entry that is sought to be preserved. If the potential entrant acquires a
larger company already in the relevant market and simply steps into the
shoes of the established firm, competition is left just the way it existed
before the merger. " 4 On the other hand, if the potential entrant can be
dissuaded from entering through a major acquisition, and thereby encouraged to enter by internal development or the acquisition and expansion of
a small firm already within the market,"s a new procompetitive force is
added to the market place. This is the thrust of the actual potential entrant theory.
Although the actual and perceived potential entrant theories are similar in many respects, they are sufficiently distinct to warrant their separate
discussion and analysis. However, it is important to consider their inter6
relationship as the Government typically will allege the loss of both."
Moreover, their combined effects may be considered in determining
whether the effects of the merger "may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly.""' 7

tance of the theory is clear. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.,
418 U.S. 602, 624-25 (1974); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S.
526 (1972); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581 (1967); United

States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 173 (1964).
111. See generally Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1362-65 (1965).
112. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
113. Id. at 625.

114. This is assuming, of course, that there are no elements of reciprocity or

entrenchment. See notes 6 & 7 supra.
115. The acquisition of a small firm, which is known as a "toehold" or "foothold" entry will be discussed at greater length below. See text accompanying
notes 182-99 infra.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602

(1974).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/4
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Actual PotentialEntrant Theory
1.

Validity of the Theory

The first question to be answered when considering the likelihood of a
successful governmental challenge based upon -the actual potential entrant theory is whether the theory itself is a valid basis for determining the
legality of a merger. Until United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. ,18 it
was generally assumed that the theory was valid and most lower courts applied it without question.11 9 In Falstaff, however, the Supreme Court
stated:
Because we remand for proper assessment of Falstaff as an onthe-fringe potential competitor, it is not necessary to reach the
question of whether § 7 bars a market-extension merger by a company whose entry into the market would have no influence whatsoever on the present state of competition in the market- that is, the
entrant will not be a dominant force in the market and has no current influence in the market place. We leave to another day the
question of the applicability of § 7 to a merger that will leave competition in the market place exactly as it was, neither hurt nor
helped, and that is challengeable under § 7 only on grounds that
the company could, but did not, enter de novo or through "toehold" acquisition and that there is less competition than there
would have been had entry been in such a manner. 120
Two years later, in United States v. Marine Bancorporation,Inc. ,121 the
Supreme Court again declined to rule on the validity of this theory.
As a consequence of Falstaff, the law of potential competition is left in
a state of uncertainty. Although several lower court and Commission decisions have upheld the validity of the actual potential entrant theory,1 22 the
theory apparently has not yet received the approval of an appellate

118. 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
119. See Ekco Products Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965); United
States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 559-63 (N.D. Ill. 1968);
Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 407, 438-42 (E.D. Mich. 1968),
aff'd on other grounds, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
253 F. Supp. 196, 227 (D. N.J. 1966). These early cases tended to slur the distinction between actual and perceived potential competition so badly that it is impossible to determine the actual grounds for their holdings. In Ekco, however, it
-appears that the court relied primarily upon what is now known as the actual
potential entrant theory.
120. 410 U.S. at 537.
121. 418 U.S. 602, 625 (1974).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226
(C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974) (trial court found both actual
and perceived potential competition); British Oxygen Co., 86 F.T.C. 1241,
[1973-76 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,063 (1975), rev'd on
other grounds and remanded sub nom. BOC Int'l, Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d
Cir. 1977). In BOC the Comnission upheld the validity of the theory solely upon
the basis of questionable precedent.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
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In the cases which have been appealed and decided in favor of the

Government, there has always been present some additional anticompetive consequence other than the loss of an actual potential entrant.
Hence the question whether the loss of an actual potential entrant is inand-of-itself enough to constitute a violation of section 7 is still open.
The crux of the controversy raised in Falstaff centers around the views
expressed by two commentators regarding the scope of the then newly
revised section 7. In 1958, Professor James A. Rahl argued in his article,
Applicability of the Clayton Act to PotentialCompetition, 124 that:

[Section 7] does not prescribe a program for increasing competition. Its prohibition runs to conduct which actually or probably
lessens competition. To treat an election not to augment competition as a lessening of competition is a neat trick, perhaps facilitated by the enveloping propensities of the phrase, "potential
competition." It is, however, plainly not authorized by the
language of the statute, nor by the philosophy of antitrust, which
does not affirmatively seek to compel competition.125
In rebuttal to Professor Rahl, Donald F. Turner, then Professor of Law at
Harvard Law School, argued that the proper manner of analysis is to compare the level of competition that would exist if the merger did not take
place, in which case the acquiring company would presumably enter de
novo or through a toehold acquisition, with the level of competition which
would exist if the merger were permitted. Thus viewed, the loss of an actual potential entrant might lessen competition, which is the result proscribed by section 7.126
Although the views of Professor Turner have been influential in the
development of other aspects of the potential competition doctrine, with
regard to the validity of the actual potential entrant theory, Professor
RahI's view appears to be the sounder position. In the legislative history of
the 1950 amendments to section 7, the committee makes repeated reference to the fact that it is the purpose of section 7 to arrest restraints of trade
before they develop into violations of the Sherman Act.1 27 A merger between two competitors, although it may increase market concentration
only one percent, may be proscribed under this "incipiency approach."
Section 7 was intended to prevent a series of actions, each insignificant in-

123. The courts of appeal have been directly confronted with this question
twice since MarineBancorporation,but have ducked the issue on both occasions.
See BOC Int'l, Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977); FTC v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977). See also Babcock & Wilcox Co. v.
United Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249, 1286 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
124. 12 ABA Antitrust Section 128 (1958).
125. Id. at 143.
126. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78
.HARV. L. REv. 1313, 1379-81 (1965).
127. [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4293, 4296, 4298.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/4
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and-of-itself, from slowly converting a market into a monopoly or tight

oligopoly. 128

The basic premise underlying the incipiency concept is that the conduct in question, if left unabated, will develop into a Sherman Act violation. Applying this notion to the actual potential competition doctrine, it
appears that Professor Rahl correctly stated the limits of section 7. If an industry contains fifty firms and each of them merges with a mere actual
potential entrant, there would not be the slightest movement towards a
monopoly or restraint on trade. Such mergers could continue ad infinitum
without ever reaching a full scale restraint. Although it may be desirable to
deconcentrate certain industries, neither the language of the act nor its
legislative history suggest that section 7 was intended to have such an effect. Thus, an actual potential entrant should not be precluded from1"
entering a market by acquisition absent other grounds establishing the
proscribed anticompetitive effects.
2.

Standard of Proof

Aside from creating uncertainty about the validity of the actual potential entrant theory, the language in Falstaff has indirectly generated
several attempts to refine the standard of proof needed to justify the application of the theory. In FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co. ,129 the Fourth Circuit found it unnecessary to decide the validity of the actual potential
entrant theory because the Government had failed to produce the required quantum of proof. Relying on Professor Turner's article and some
"peripheral support" from Marine Bancorporation,1 ° the court concluded that in order to reach the actual potential entrant question the
Government must produce "unequivocal proof' that the acquiring firm
would actually enter the market de novo or through a toehold acquisition
if the challenged merger was not permitted."13 Since the Federal Trade
Commission had based its findings on a less rigorous standard, the court
reversed the Commission's decision.
The "unequivocal proof' standard, which represented a substantial
departure from the previously established "reasonable likelihood of entry"
test, 1 2 did not long go without criticism. In BOC InternationalLtd. v.
128.
129.

Id. at 4297.
549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977).

130. 418 U.S. 602 (1974). The peripheral support the court of appeals referred to was the following language:
Unequivocal proof that an acquiring firm actually would have entered
de novo but for a merger is rarely available. Thus, as Falstaff indicates,
the principal focus of the doctrine is on the likely effects of the premerger
position of the acquiring firm on the fringe of the target market.
Id. at 624.
131. 549 F.2d at 294.
132. See, e.g., Ekco Products Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745, 753-54 (7th Cir.
Published1965).
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FTC13 3 the Second Circuit flatly rejected the "unequivocal proof' standard and applied the "reasonable probability" test.13 4 Had the court
stopped there, however, it would have had to face the difficult question of
the viability of the actual potential entrant theory. Rather than do that,
the Second Circuit found language in Marine Bancorporationwhich supported a different gloss upon the actual potential entrant theory. The
court concluded that proof of the reasonable probability of eventful entry
was not enough, and instead, found that the probable entry test must
''contain some reasonable temporal estimate related to the near future,
with 'near' defined in terms of the entry barriers and lead time necessary
for entry into the particular industry." 13 5
The "near future" requirement ofB O C is too current to have been the
subject of a substantial amount of comment, but it is surely to become a
source of litigation. What the court intended by this new addition to the
actual potential competition theory is somewhat unclear. Presumably, by
defining "near" with reference to lead time, the court meant that the
Government must show that the decision or commitment to enter will be
made in the near future. If this is proven, it is irrelevant that the lead time
required to enter the market may forestall actualentry for a long period of
time. Otherwise, industries which require several years of research and
development to perfect a marketable product would be immunized from
the actual potential entrant theory.
What the court meant by defining "near" with reference to entry barriers is a more difficult question. In Fruehauf Corp. 136 the Commission
concluded that the "near future" requirement inBOC did not require that
the likely time of entry be specified in absolute terms. Rather, the Commission concluded that BOC, by defining "near" with reference to entry
barriers, intended that the time of entry could be specified in contingent
terms.137 Hence, Fruehauf would permit the Government to prove its case
by showing that the acquiring firm would enter the target market at some
indeterminate time in the future, given a shift in conditions within the
market. For example, prices may currently be too low to entice the potential entrant into the market. However, should they rise ten or twenty
percent, the potential entrant might rapidly commence the process of
entering the market. Fruehauf,in dicta, stated that the "near future" requirement did not prevent the Commission from prohibiting the potential
entrant from entering via a major acquisition under such conditions. The
purpose of the potential competition doctrine, the Commission reasoned,
was to keep the acquiring firm out of the market until such time as sufficiently supracompetitive price levels make it worthwhile to enter de novo
133. 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977).
134. Id. at 28-29 n.7.
135. Id. at 29. Accord, Babcock &Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp.,
435 F. Supp. 1249, 1286 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
136. 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,402 (1978).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/4
137. Id. at 21,376-77 & n.33.
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or by a,toehold acquisition. If the "near future" test were applied literally,
this object would be defeated.
Although the Commission may have correctly stated the purpose of the
actual potential entrant theory, it could not disguise the fact that it was
circumventing the B OC decision. Unless Fruehaufalso requires proof that
the shift in the market would occur within a brief period of time, the position the Commission has taken is contrary to the rule laid down in B OC.
BOG itself was a reaction to a Commission finding of a section 7 violation
where the potential entrant would not have entered under the prevailing
market conditions, but would have done so if profits in the target industry
improved. 3 8 Consequently, it appears that BOC was attempting to limit
speculation on future market conditions when assessing whether a company is a potential entrant. The court's reference to entry barriers, there-'
fore, does not seem susceptible to the interpretation Fruehaufwould put
on it. Rather, BOG was probably referring to entry barriers in the same
context as lead time. The court apparently intended to require proof that
the acquiring firm would commit itself to enter the target market within
the near future, even though actual entry might not occur until some years
later when the barriers to entry had been overcome. This requirement
may, as the Commission suggested, take much of the air out of the sails of
the actual potential entrant theory, and perhaps BOG is wrong, but the
decision ought to be recognized for what it says.
3.

Nature and Manner of Proof

In spite of the uncertainties which attend the actual potential entrant
theory, lower courts continue to hear evidence and make findings with
respect to this theory. Hence, consideration must be given to the manner
in which "reasonable probability" (or "unequivocal proof') of entry may
be shown. The basic test stated in Marine Bancorporation is that the
Government must show that "feasible alternative methods of entry in fact
existed."1 3 9
The "feasible alternative means of entry" requirement announced by
Marine Bancorporationgoes to the very heart of the actual potential entrant theory, and hinges upon the likelihood that the acquiring company
would actually enter the target market de novo or through a toehold acquisition if the more attractive method- acquiring the target firm - were not
possible.140 In evaluating whether a company has a feasible means of entry
other than the challenged acquisition, it is necessary to analyze both the
incentive and the capability of the acquiring firm to enter the relevant
138.

See British Oxygen Co., 86 F.T.C. 1241, 1359-60, [1973-76 Transfer

Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)

21,063 at 20,916 (1975), rev'd and remanded

sub nom. BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977).
139. 418 U.S. at 638.
140. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 572 (1973)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
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market either de novo or by toehold acquisition. 14 If either factor is absent, the actual potential entrant theory is inapplicable.
a.

Subjective Evidence of Capability and Incentive

Obviously, the most forthright manner of proving that a company is a
potential entrant is evidence of management's intentions. If the acquiring
company's board of directors decided that the company would enter de
novo or through a toehold acquisition if the desired merger could not be
arranged, such a decision would ipso facto make the acquiring company
an actual potential entrant. 4 2 Assuming that the actual potential competitor theory is valid, the only remaining question would be whether the
merger had sufficient anticompetitive consequences to constitute a violation.
In the cases which have been litigated thus far, however, the Government has not been able to produce such conclusive subjective evidence.
Instead, the Government has frequently attempted to utilize lower
management reports and recommendations, as well as indecisive studies
done by or on behalf of upper management. 4 3 Generally the courts have
recognized that recommendations of lower management are often only
sales pitches and therefore should not be given undue weight. "44 Nevertheless, such reports might be considered an indication of corporate interest
in the target market which, along with objective evidence, may establish
45
that the acquiring firm was a potential entrant.
While internal memoranda favoring de novo or toehold entry may
constitute fairly persuasive evidence against the acquiring company, the
converse is clearly not the case. The courts tend to be rather reluctant to
give credence to internal decisions rejecting de novo or toehold entry, particularly when objective evidence indicates that the acquiring firm has the
incentive and capability to enter the market. 4 6 Such memoranda or testi141. See FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 299 (4th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 755 (D. Md. 1976);
United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973),
aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974). See generally Dunfee & Stern, supra note 5.
142. Turner, supra note 126, at 1383.
143. See FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 296-97 & n.9 (4th Cir.
1977); FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105, 112 (D. D.C. 1977); United
States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 762 n.64 (D. Md. 1976);
United States v. Crowell, Collier and MacMillan, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 983, 1004-05
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 246 F. Supp. 917, 926-27 (D.
Del. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 308 (1967).
144. See, e.g., FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 296-97 & n.9
(4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Crowell, Collier and MacMillan, Inc., 361 F.
Supp. 983, 1004-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
145. See, e.g., Stanley Works, 78 F.T.C. 1023, [1970-73 Transfer Binder]
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 19,646 (1971), affd, 469 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973).
146. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 563-70 (1973)
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/4
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mony, generated with an eye towards a more favorable manner of entry,
obviously are self-serving and will not be conclusive, or even particularly
147
persuasive.
Where the objective evidence is inconclusive, subjective evidence of
management's rejection of de novo or toehold entry may tip the scales in
favor of the defendant. 148 Hence, if upper management does not believe
feasible alternative means of entry are open, it may be advantageous to get
that decision on record and the reasons therefor so as to avoid an inference
49
that such other means of entry were never given fair consideration.1
b.

Objective Evidence of Capability and Incentive

The Government may be able to prove that the acquiring firm had the
incentive and capability to enter the target market de novo (or through a
toehold acquisition) solely by the use of objective evidence although most
cases thus far use both. Objective factors which the courts have considered
in evaluating incentive to enter the target market include:
(1) The rate of growth and profit margins within the target
market; 1 0
(2) Lead time required for de novo or toehold entry; 15 1
(Marshall, J., concurring); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp.
1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974); British Oxygen Co., 86
F.T.C. 1241, 1359, [1973-76 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,063
at 20,916 (1975), rev'd and remanded sub nom. BOG Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d
24 (2d Cir. 1977).
147. Subjective evidence generated in contemplation of merger should be
distinguished, however, from established company policies developed without
regard to possible litigation. While the former is suspect, the latter may be persuasive evidence. For example, in United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 246 F.
Supp. 917, 931 (D. Del. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 308 (1967), the trial
court placed considerable emphasis on evidence that Pensalt had an established
investment policy requiring a rate of return in excess of 25 % on new investments.
On the basis of this evidence, the court rejected all modes of entry suggested by
the Government which were not likely to provide such a return.
148. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 570 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring); FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 298 & n.11
(4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1239
(C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
149. See United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1243
(C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
150. See United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 755 (D.
Md. 1976); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1245
(C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974); United States v. Wilson
Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 561 (N.D. Ill. 1968). Corporations are
presumed to follow their economic best interests. Therefore, where a company
has the capability to enter a rapidly expanding or highly profitable market, it is
assumed that the company desires to do so. As it will be shown later, however,
such markets tend to be attractive to many companies if the barriers to entry are
not too high. Thus the loss of one potential entrant may be insignificant.
151. See FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 296 (4th Cir. 1977);
& Decker
Mfg. Co.,Repository,
430 F. Supp.
States
v. BlackSchool
PublishedUnited
by University
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of Law Scholarship
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(3) Degree of risk involved in a de novo or toehold entry;' 52
(4) Complementary nature of the target market in relation to
markets
in which the acquiring firm is currently a competi53
tor; 1
5
(5) Acquiring firm's history and commitment to diversification;1 4
(6) Overt actions taken by the acquiring firm which indicate an
interest in the target market.1 5
1976); United States v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F. Supp. 407, 439 (E.D. Mich. 1968),
aff'd, 405 U.S. 562 (1972). Long lead times for de novo or toehold entry may
result in unacceptable payback periods or prevent the acquiring company from
taking advantage of short term increases in demand. For example, a rapidly expanding market may not be an attractive area for internal expansion if the time
needed to develop a viable product will prevent the entering firm from getting
into the market before the surge in demand has leveled off. See United States v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 480 F. Supp. at 760.
152. See FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 299 (4th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965), aff'dper
curiam, 418 U.S. 906 (1974). Obviously the greater the risk, the lesser the incentive to enter the target market. In Penn-Olin, the risk involved in entering a field
dependent upon defense spending was a major factor influencing the court's decision that independent entry of Pennsalt Chemicals Corporation or Olin
Mathieson Chemical Corporation was unlikely.
153. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1972); FTC
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
549 F.2d 289, 295 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F.
Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974); United States v.
Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 561 (N.D. Ill. 1968). The cases
generally suggest a presumption that a company is most likely to fill out its product lines and expand its geographic markets before undertaking entry into an
unrelated field. For example, in Falstaff, the acquiring company sold beer
throughout the United States, except in New England. There was also evidence
that being a national brewer enhanced a beer's prestige and reduced the risk of
sales fluctuations due to unfavorable weather conditions. Such evidence indicated an incentive for the acquiring company to enter the target market.
154. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967); FTC v.
Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105, 113 (D. D.C. 1977); United States v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 756 (D. Md. 1976); United States v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1240 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S.
906 (1974); Stanley Works v. FTC, 78 F.T.C. 1023, 1070 [1970-73 Transfer
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 19,646 at 21,700 (1971), aff'd, 469 F.2d 498
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 929 (1973). A company's general desire to
expand, the pattern of its previous expansion, and the manner in which it has
grown may all be considered in evaluating whether the company is a potential entrant. For example, in Procter & Gamble, Procter had a long history of de novo
growth into markets similar to the bleach target market. Therefore, the court
considered Procter's former conduct as evidence that Procter would have entered
the bleach market de novo. Cf. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288
F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (history of expansion by acquisition suggests de
novo entry unlikely).
155. Prior attempts to acquire a company already within the target market,
see, e.g., FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105, 111 (D.D.C. 1977), as well as
studies undertaken to evaluate de novo entry, see, e.g., United States v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1242 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/4
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This, of course, is by no means an exhaustive list of relevant considerations. Any factor which management might consider significant in choosing the company's course of action would undoubtedly be relevant.
However, the six factors listed above are those which the courts thus far
have considered most relevant.
In addition to incentive, the Government must show that the acquiring
company has the capability of entering the target market de novo or
through a toehold acquisition. Objective evidence plays a particularly important role in proving the criteria.
57
6
Capability is measured in terms of the economic,1 technologica
and marketing' 8 strengths needed to make a successful de novo or toehold
entry. Often it is simply a battle of expert witnesses as to the degree of
resource flexibility which exists. There are some facts, however, that may
not need expert analysis. For instance, the prior failure or success of other
companies attempting to enter the target market, 59 or the acquiring company's prior success or failure in entering similar markets, 6 0 may tend to
speak for themselves.
906 (1974), have been considered indicative of an interest in the target market.
Indeed, in United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 561
(N.D. Ill. 1968), the court said that the acquisition being challenged was itself
evidence of the acquiring company's interest in the target market. Courts should
be cautious, however, in considering a company's interest in merger as indicative
of interest in de novo entry. The desire to enter the target market cannot be
divorced from the means to be employed, otherwise there would be a presumption of incentive to enter de novo in every case. See United States v. CrockerAnglo Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133, 184 (N.D. Cal. 1967). See also Ekco
Products Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745, 752 (7th Cir. 1965).
156. See, e.g., FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105, 113 (D.D.C. 1977).
157. See FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 296 (4th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 1978-1 Trade Cases 62,063 at
74,616 (E.D. Pa. 1978); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp.
729, 758 (D. Md. 1976).
158. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United
States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 762-65 (D. Md, 1976). In
Procter& Gamble the target market, laundry bleach, had few technical barriers.
Success depended primarily upon advertising and distribution. Consequently,
marketing ability was a key factor.
159. In United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md.
1976), the court considered it unlikely that a company possessing only electric
motor technology could successfully enter the two-cycle engine market when a
company like Ford Motor Company, with its vast gasoline engine experience, had
felt it necessary to acquire the technology of a toehold firm and even then failed to
become a significant competitor. Cf. United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367
F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974) (successful entry
of another firm undercut defendant's argument that barriers were too high);
British Oxygen Co., 86 F.T.C. 1241, 1356-57, [1973-76 Transfer Binder] Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,063 at 20,914 (1975), rev'd on other grounds and remanded sub nom. BOG Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977) (successful
entry by another firm indicates BOG's capability).
160. Compare United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
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As with the factors evidencing incentive, no one aspect of capability
will always control. The absence of marketing capability may be crucial if
such capability cannot easily be acquired, but may be of no importance if
it can be obtained easily. The weight of each element of capability will
generally vary according to the circumstances of a given case, making it a
factual question as to whether the acquiring company possessed the requisite capability. This is, of course, frustrating to the businessman who
wants an answer, but it is simply an unavoidable result of the full rule of
reason type of analysis which still prevails in the area of potential competition.

B.

Perceived PotentialEntrant Theory

Even though the acquiring company is not an actual potential entrant,
it may still constitute a potential competitor under the perceived potential
entrant theory,1 6 1 which focuses on the appearance of the company as a
potential entrant, rather than on the likelihood of actual entry. This does
not mean, however, that the factors considered in evaluating whether the
acquiring company is an actual potential entrant are irrelevant to the
perceived potential entrant theory. The burden is still on the Government
to show that "the acquiring firm has the characteristics, capabilities and
economic incentive to render it a perceived potential de novo or toehold
entrant." 1 62 Consequently, most of the factors which are relevant to the actual potential entrant theory are also germane to the perceived potential
63
entrant theory.1
While the evidence supporting the two theories will overlap substantially, there are significant differences in the manner and type of proof.
Because the perceived potential competition theory is based upon the effect of the perceived threat of entry, only conditions which competitors
within the target market could be aware of are relevant.164 Thus, an undisclosed internal decision not to enter the target market is of no relevance to
(C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974) (prior success in entering
similar markets de novo considered evidence of capability) with United States v.
Consolidated Foods Corp., 1978-1 Trade Cases 62,063 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (prior
unsuccessful attempts to enter target marke.t considered evidence of lack of
capability).
161. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 532-33
(1973); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 769 (D. Md.
1976); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 562 (N.D.
Ill. 1968).
162. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 624-25
(1974).
163. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 639-40
(1974); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 533-36 & n.12
(1973), on remand, 383 F. Supp. 1020, 1023-25 (D.R.I. 1974); United States v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 743 n.24, 770 (D. Md. 1976).
164. See United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1238
(C.D.
Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/4
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the question of perceived potential competition, 65 nor, conversely, are undisclosed efforts and discussions favoring entry. Companies naturally must
evaluate competition with less than complete knowledge; therefore, it is in
this light that the acquiring company's potential for entry should be
viewed.
1. Subjective Proof of "Fringe Effects"
As with actual potential competition, perceived potential competition
may be proven by subjective evidence. Existing competitors within the
market may simply be called as witnesses and asked whether they had considered the acquiring firm a potential competitor and, if so, whether or not
this possibility influenced their behavior. Such evidence may be produced
by either the Government 6 6 or the defendant in the case. 167
Although this may seem to be a simple, reliable manner of getting
to the ultimate question in such cases, such evidence is suspect since a competitor's testimony may be self-serving and thus slanted towards an
anticompetitive result. Furthermore, businessmen may not always be consciously aware of the fact that they are considering potential competitors in
their business decisions, even though empirical evidence supposedly bears
out that they do.16 Nevertheless, such testimony may be very convincing
when it appears to be in accord with objective evidence. Moreover, such
evidence is easily understood, and may be quite influential in a close case
involving complicated objective evidence. In fact, several recent lower
court decisions have apparently placed considerable reliance on subjective
testimony, particularly those finding for the defendant companies. 1 69
2.

Objective Evidence of "Fringe Effects"

In spite of the simplicity of subjective evidence, most potential
competition cases appear to have been decided primarily upon objective
(circumstantial) evidence. To establish that a company is a perceived
potential entrant through the use of circumstantial evidence, there must
be evidence from which it can be inferred that firms within the target
165.
166.

See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 533 (1973).
See, e.g., United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729,

770-71 (D. Md. 1976); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp.

543, 561 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
167. See United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 1978-1 Trade Cases
62,063 at 74,617 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (uncontroverted testimony of competitors that
they were aware of acquiring firms past history of failure); United States v. Black
& Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 770-71 (D. Md. 1976) (conflicting testimony of competitors); The Budd Co., 86 F.T.C. 518, 579-80, [1973-76 Transfer
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 20,998 at 20,856 (1975) (not perceived as an
entrant and did not influence behavior).
168. J. BAIN, BARRIERS To NEW COMPETITION 203-04 (1956). See also
United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976).
169. See cases cited note 167 supra.
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market: (1) were aware of the acquiring firm's interest in entering de novo
(or through a toehold acquisition); (2) believed that it had the capability
and incentive to do so; and (3) reacted to the threat.
In some cases the first requirement may be established by the proximity of the acquiring firm to the target market. Typically these cases are
geographic market extension mergers, 170 or product extension mergers involving closely related or complementary products. i71 Because of the
logical nexus between the acquiring company and the target market, the
very nature of the acquiring company will alert competitors within the
target market of the threat the acquiring company poses. In mergers
which are more purely conglomerate in nature, however, there must be
some proof of conduct on the part of the acquiring firm which identifies it
as a potential entrant. Such conduct may take the form of a minor acquisition in the industry,1 7 2 prior negotiations with other potential merger partners, 17 or public announcements by management 74 which signal the
acquiring company's interest in the target market.
Aspects of the second requirement, perceived capability and incentive, are generally established by much the same evidence used to prove
capability and incentive under the actual potential entrant theory. 175
Companies within the target market are generally presumed to be aware of
the major barriers to entry, as well as the capabilities and goals of the acquiring company insofar as that information is known to the industry. If,
taking into account the major barriers to entry, a reasonable competitor
within the target market would perceive the acquiring firm as a potential
de novo or toehold entrant, then the second requirement is satisfied. i76
However, where the acquiring firm obviously lacks necessary economic,
technical, or marketing capabilities, firms within the target market are
assumed to have been unaffected by the acquiring firm. 177
170. See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973),
on remand, 383 F. Supp. 1020 (D.R.I. 1974); United States v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
171. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter& Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (maker of
detergents entered liquid bleach market); United States v. Wilson Sporting
Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (sporting goods company acquired
gymnastic equipment company).
172. See Kennecott Copper Corp., 78 F.T.C. 744, [1970-73 Transfer Binder]
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 19,619 (1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974).
173. See United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D.
Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974); Chemetron Corp. v. Crane Co.,
1977-2 Trade Cases 61,717 at 72,929 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
174. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 529 n.8
(1973).
175. Id. at 533-34 & n.13.
176. Id. at 533.
177. See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602,
639 (1974) (competitors are presumed to be aware of regulatory barriers); United
States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 383 F. Supp. 1020 (D.R.I. 1974), on remand
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/4
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Finally, it must be shown that the firms within the market reacted to
the presence of the acquiring company, i.e., that the company did produce fringe effects. There is some language in Marine Bancorporation
which suggests that proof of actual fringe effects may be required, "'but it
is doubtful that the court actually meant to rule out circumstantial proof
of such effects. Only a year before in Falstaffthe Supreme Court had said:
"Circumstantial evidence is the lifeblood of antitrust law; . . . '[p]otential

competition cannot be put to a subjective test."' 17 9 Thus, it is probably
permissible to infer substantial fringe effects if the target market is highly
concentrated. 180

C.

The Toehold Acquisition Theory

Up until this point the potential competition doctrine has been discussed primarily in terms of the probability (either actual or perceived)
that the acquiring company would have entered the target market through
internal growth, i.e., de novo entry. This was the theory behind the
Government's early cases, and continues to be the primary thrust of the
potential competition doctrine even today. However, analysis of the potential competition doctrine would not be complete without considering the
"toehold" or "foothold" theory.
The development of the toehold theory began with the 1965 Federal
Trade Commission decision in Beatrice Foods Co. ,181 wherein the Commission noted that the acquisition of a small concern by a substantial
potential competitor may increase competition in the market "by injecting
a substantial firm, one capable of challenging the dominant firms in the
market, in place of a firm too small to be a significant competitive factor."'8 2 In other words, Beatrice recognized that the acquisition and expansion of a small firm already within the target market may have much
the same procompetitive effect as a de novo entry.
Though Beatrice set the stage by articulating the concept, it was not
until five years later in The Bendix Corp.183 that the toehold theory was
from 410 U.S. 526 (1972).
178. "[T]he Court has recognized that a market extension merger may be
unlawful if the target market is substantially concentrated, if the acquiring firm
has the characteristics, capabilities, and economic incentive to render it a
perceived potential de novo entrant, and if the acquiring firm's premerger
presence on the fringe of the market infact tempered oligopolistic behavior on
the part of existing participants in the market." 418 U.S. at 624-25 (emphasis

supplied).
179. 410 U.S. at 534 n.13.
180. See United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1257
(C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
181. 67 F.T.C. 473, [1965-67 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
17,244 (1965).
182. Id. at 720, (CCH) at 22,332.
183. 77 F.T.C. 731, [1970-73 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
19,288 (1970), vacated and remanded, 450 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1971).
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recognized as a possible complement to the Government's arsenal against
conglomerate mergers. In Bendix the Commission, relying upon the language in Beatrice, concluded that the potential competition doctrine did
not depend exclusively upon the probability of de novo entry into the
target market. Accepting arguendo the hearing examiner's finding that
the acquiring company would not have entered the target market through
internal development, the Commission nonetheless found that the acquiring company was a potential entrant via the acquisition of a small toehold
firm. Although later reversed on procedural grounds, 8 4 the Bendix decision remains the leading case on the toehold theory.
The significance of the toehold theory is that, to some extent, it may
lessen the Government's burden of proof. Obviously it is less difficult to
show that a firm can enter a market through a small acquisition than it is
to prove that the company is capable of entering the market solely on the
basis of its own internal development. Indeed, language in two Commission decisions has led some commentators to conclude that the toehold
theory has created a presumption of illegality for non-toehold acquisition.18 5 Subsequent case law, however, has shown that the toehold theory
has not had such a radical effect,18 6 and has not drastically altered the
manner of potential competition analysis. The Government still must
show that the acquiring firm had the incentive and capability to enter the
target market. The major difference is that the analysis focuses on the
capability and incentive to become an effective competitor by development of a small established firm within the target market, rather than entry through internal development.
In spite of the fact that the toehold theory has been around for nearly a
decade, the courts have failed to provide adequate guidance as to what
constitutes a toehold acquisition. Probably the best general definition of a
toehold firm was enunciated in FTC v. Tenneco, Inc. ,187 where the court
stated:
A toehold may be defined as (1) a small available corporation with
(2) the relevant technical expertise (3) which is not dominant or
otherwise significant in the American or foreign market and which
(4) has a88reasonable likelihood of serving as a viable market entry
vehicle. 1

184. Bendix Corp. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1971). The court of appeals found that the Government had never given Bendix notice that it was proceeding under the toehold theory. Consequently, basing a finding upon this
theory violated § 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
185. See, e.g., Comment, Toehold Acquisitions and the PotentialCompetition Doctrine, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 156 (1972).
186. See Beatrice Foods Co., 86 F.T.C. 1, 65, [1973-76 Transfer Binder]
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 20,944 at 20,791-92 (1975), aff'd, 540 F.2d 303 (7th

Cir. 1976).
187. 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977).
188. Id. at 112 (footnotes omitted).
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Although this is the most comprehensive judicial definition of toehold
company, it offers little in the way of concrete guidance, particularly with
respect to the permissible size of a toehold firm.
There have, however, been some attempts to quantify the term "toehold." In UnitedStates v. PhillipsPetroleum Co., 19 the court stated that a
toehold acquisition is "one which is sufficient to assist the potential entrant
over the barriers and into the market, but not so large that the entrant
merely replaces the acquired company; the acquiring company must have
a substantial need to build upon the acquisition."' 190 The court then proceeded to reject the defendant's argument that the acquisition in question
was a toehold acquisition. In doing so, the court stated that "acquisition of
a company which ranks seventh in a concentrated market, holding a 6-7 %
share of the market, is simply not small enough to constitute a mere 'foothold acquisition."'
Consequently, after Phillips it appeared that a
toehold company could not have a market share in excess of 5%, at least
where it was among the top five or ten firms in the industry.
It was not long after Phillips, however, before the Federal Trade Commission had an opportunity to state its views on what constitutes an appropriate toehold firm. In The Budd Co. ,192 the Commission arrived at the
following conclusion:
We believe it to be desirable to observe a general rule in potential
competition cases that firms possessing no more than 10% in a
target market (where, as here, the 4-firm concentration ratio is approximately 60% or more) should ordinarily be presumed to be
toehold or foothold firms. This presumption by no means is conclusive and the inference of lack of anticompetitive effects flowing
from acquisition of such a firm may be rebutted in particular
cases. 193
In formulating this test the Commission acknowledged the holding in
Phillips, but ruled that it and the Budd case were distinguishable. Despite
the unambiguous language of Phillips, the Commission stated that the
court's holding had not been based upon the size of the acquired firm, but
rather on the fact that Phillips did not need to build on the acquisition.' 9 4
The Commission thus found that its test did not conflict with Phillips
because, upon a showing that there was no need to expand the acquired
firm, the Budd presumption would be rebutted and the result reached
would be the same as in Phillips.
Since Budd the courts have continued to rely upon Phillips,15 while
189. 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
190. Id. at 1258.
191. Id.
192. 86 F.T.C. 518, [1973-76 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
20,998 (1975).
193. Id. at 582-83, (CCH) at 20,857.
194. Id. at 582 n.8, (CCH) at 20,857 n.8.
See FTC
v. Tenneco,
433 F. Supp.
105, 113
Published195.
by University
of Missouri
School ofInc.,
Law Scholarship
Repository,
1979 (D.D.C. 1977). Inter-
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the Commission has adhered to the ten percent cutoff suggested in
Budd.196 As a result, a firm with six to ten percent of the relevant market is
presumptively a toehold firm in litigation before the Commission, but presumptively too large to be a toehold insofar as the courts are concerned.
Which rule is better from a defendant's point of view will vary. If the
Government is claiming that a major acquisition was made when a toehold
entry was possible, a defendant obviously would prefer the Phillips test
which would limit the number of toehold firms more severely than the
Budd standard. On the other hand, if the defendant is trying to make use
of the toehold doctrine as a defense,1 97 the Budd rule will permit the acquisition of a fairly substantial firm without exceeding the presumptively
lawful toehold size. The test which is ultimately adopted may well depend
upon the context in which the question arises.
Before going further, it should be noted that in spite of the widespread
reference to the toehold theory in the language of judicial opinions, the
validity of the theory is still an open question. Falstaff,in addition to questioning the soundness of the actual potential entry theory, casts doubt
upon the toehold doctrine. 198 Since the toehold theory is premised largely
upon the desire to preserve the opportunity for actual future deconcentration, as is the actual potential entrant theory, much of the toehold theory
will be undercut if the actual potential entrant theory is ultimately found
to be invalid.1 99
It is important also to note at this point that there does not appear to be
even a single appellate'decision based upon the toehold theory. Consequently, the validity of the doctrine should not be presumed. Indeed,
there is no indication in any of the cases that the theory has ever been
seriously questioned. Therefore, like many other aspects of the potential
competition doctrine, the toehold theory is an embryonic concept, the
eventful fate of which is still unknown.
IV.

NECESSARY SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT

Even assuming that the acquiring company is found to be a potential
entrant, entry into the target market via acquisition of a major firm is not
necessarily illegal. Section 7 proscribes only those mergers which may
estingly, Tenneco used the narrower definition from Phillipsto the Government's
disadvantage.
196. See British Oxygen Co., 86 F.T.C. 1241, 1357, [1973-76 Transfer
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,063 at 20,915 (1975), rev'd on other
grounds and remandedsub nom. BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.
1977).
197. See text accompanying notes 242-45 infra.
198. See 410 U.S. at 537. See also text accompanying notes 119-20 supra.
199. The toehold theory would not be completely eliminated, however,
because it might still be possible to use the theory in conjunction with perceived
potential competition by showing that the acquiring firm is perceived as a likely
toehold entrant.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/4
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substantially lessen competition, or'tend to create a monopoly. Thus, if
there is a less-than-substantial loss of procompetitive potential, its loss does
not violate section 7.
In assessing whether the loss of a potential entrant may substantially
lessen competition, there are several factors which the courts have considered: (1) the likelihood that de novo or toehold entry would ultimately
produce deconcentration in the target market; (2) the number of potential
entrants; (3) the degree of concentration within the target market; and (4)
the size of the acquired firm.
A.

SubstantialLikelihood of Deconcentration

In United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc. ,200 the Supreme
Court stated that before the actual potential entrant theory may be applied, the Government must show that there were available to the acquiring firm feasible means of entering the target market other than by the
acquisition in question. Further, the Government must show "that those
means offer a substantial likelihood of ultimately producing deconcentration of that market or other significant procompetitive effects."201 Although Marine Bancorporationexpressly stated this requirement only in
terms of the actual potential entrant theory, the requirement would seem
20 2
equally applicable to the perceived potential entrant theory.
A brief statement of the facts from Marine Bancorporationwill illustrate this requirement. In that case a large Seattle-based bank acquired a
medium-sized bank whose headquarters and branches were located in
Spokane. The Government challenged the merger and argued that the
Seattle bank should have used a toehold acquisition to enter the Spokane
market. Under Washington banking laws, however, there could have been
no further branching of any bank so acquired. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court concluded that a toehold entry under such regulations would not
allow the expansion necessary to offer a substantial likelihood of producing deconcentration. 20 3 In essence, limiting the acquiring firm to a toehold
entry would have simply amounted to requiring the firm to step into the
shoes of a small firm rather than a large one, even though neither course of
action would have a substantial likelihood of altering the market.
Although Marine Bancorporation dealt with a regulated industry,
lower courts have imposed this requirement in non-regulated industries as
200. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
201. Id. at 633.
202. United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 745 (D.
Md. 1976). If competitors within the target market know that de novo or toehold
entry does not offer a likelihood of producing significant procompetitive effects,
they will not be influenced by the presence of the potential entrant on the edge of
the market. Hence no significant procompetitive effects would be lost if the
potential entrant entered the market via a major acquisition.
203. 410 U.S. at 638-39.
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well. For example, in United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co. ,204 the
court found that technological barriers prevented a de novo or toehold entry by Black & Decker from offering a substantial likelihood of deconcentrating the gasoline powered chain saw market. The court noted that Ford
Motor Company, which presumably was substantially better qualified to
attempt such an entry than Black & Decker, had failed to develop its toehold company into a significant competitor. Where it appears that a de
novo or toehold entry will fail to produce meaningful competition in the
target market, little is lost by permitting the merger to proceed. Conse2
quently, such mergers do not violate section 7. 05
Another situation in which de novo or toehold entry may not offer a
substantial. likelihood of deconcentration occurs when the acquiring firm
is simply too small to become a substantial competitor. There have been no
such cases, undoubtedly because the Government does not concern itself
with such mergers. However, the size of the acquiring company is a relevant factor in the potential competition analysis and should not be over206
looked in a proper case.
B.

Number of PotentialEntrants

It is fairly well established that in order to prove that the loss of a perceived potential entrant may substantially lessen competition, it must be
shown that the acquiring firm was one of the few most likely entrants into
the target market. 207 That is, if there are a substantial number of firms
similarly situated on the edge of the market, the loss of one will not significantly lessen the disciplining effect of perceived potential competition
because the remaining firms will continue to pose a threat. 20 8 Consequently, an acquisition under such circumstances would not violate the
perceived potential entrant theory.
204. 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976).
205. But see Turner, supra note 126, at 1383. Turner suggests that even
though the potential entrant may ultimately fail to make substantial inroads into
the market, the process of making the attempt will "shake things up." Therefore
Turner presumably would prohibit a merger unless the inability to become a
significant competitor was so clear from the outset that significant in terroremeffects were unlikely.
206. See Beatrice Foods Co., 67 F.T.C. 473, 719, [1965-67 Transfer Binder]
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 17,244 at 22,332 (1965).
207. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581 (1967); FTC v.
Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105, 112-13 (D.D.C. 1977); United States v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 771 (D. Md. 1976); United States v. Hughes
Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637, 646 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Copperweld v. Imetal, 403 F.
Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F.
Supp. 1226, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974); The Budd
Co., 86 F.T.C. 518, 577, [1973-76 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
20,998 at 20,854 (1975). See generally Department of Justice Merger Guidelines
[1968] 1 Trade Reg. Rep. 4,510; Dunfee & Stern, supra note 5, at 831-33, 861;
Turner, supra note 126, at 1363.
208. See generally Turner, supra note 126, at 1363.
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Although it is reasonably clear that a perceived potential entrant must
be one of the few most likely entrants, it is not clear whether a similar requirement applies to the actual potential entrant. Professor Swennes concludes that it does not, 20 9 but case law, though unclear, seems to suggest
otherwise.2 10 As of yet, however, there does not appear to be any definitive
holding on this question.
Assuming the requirement is applicable, either because the case at
hand involves perceived potential competition, or because the requirement is extended to actual potential entrants, the question then becomes
one of proof. In theory the Government should have to produce evidence
with respect to each and every potential entrant, and establish that only a
21
few could match the incentive and capability of the acquiring firm. '
This, of course, is impossible as a practical matter. Instead, the cases seem
to proceed upon the assumption that if the entry barriers are high, the
number of likely potential entrants will be few. 21 2 When a company is
shown to be a likely de novo entrant into an industry where entry barriers
are high, it is presumed that the acquiring firm was one of the few most
likely potential entrants. Several cases have indicated that the acquiring
company may be able to rebut this presumption by showing that there are
other firms which are also likely entrants. 21 3 In a few cases the courts have
actually undertaken a perfunctory comparative analysis to determine how
many firms appear to be at least as likely to enter the market as the acquir2 14
ing firm.
209. Swennes, Three Theories of PotentialCompetition Under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act: Reaching the Conglomerate Merger, 49 TUL. L. Rv. 139, 154
& n.62 (1974).
210. In FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977), the
Government challenged a merger exclusively upon the actual potential entrant
theory. Id. at 293 n.6. In its decision, the court noted that the Government had
failed to prove that the acquiring firm was one of the few most likely entrants. Id.
at 294 n.8. See also Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851,
865 n.30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
211. See generally Dunfee & Stern, supra note 5. Even the Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines [1968] suggest that such a comparative analysis is required. 1 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 14,510 at 6,888.
212. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581 (1967);
Beatrice Foods Co., 81 F.T.C. 481, 526-30, [1970-73 Transfer Binder] Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 20,121 at 22,109-11 (1972).
213. See, e.g., FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977)
(entry barriers high, but ARCO just one of 18 petroleum companies, all of which
are potential entrants); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp.
729, 771-72(D. Md. 1976).
214. See United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 771-72
(D. Md.); United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637, 647 (C.D. Cal.
1976); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1254 (C.D.
Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974); The Stanley Works, 78 F.T.C.
1023, 1071 n.18, [1970-73 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 19,646 at
21,701 n.18 (1971), aff'd on other grounds, 469 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973) (relying upon defendant's own evaluation of other
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
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The likelihood of entry is not the only factor, however. The potential
competition theory is primarily concerned with those firms whose entry is
likely to lead to eventual deconcentration of the market. In determining
the number of potential entrants, insignificant potential entrants should
be ignored. This concept was implicity recognized in FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co.2 15 where the Supreme Court concluded that "the number of
potential entrants [into the liquid bleach market] was not so large that the
elimination of one would be insignificant.1 216 The Court evidently con-

sidered only those entrants who could challenge Clorox, the industry
leader, because the evidence showed that the technology needed to produce bleach was simple and the capital investment relatively nominal.
There were obviously many potential small scale entrants, but the need for
massive advertising made it unlikely that other than a few firms could challenge Clorox. The Court apparently believed that these smaller firms were
insignificant potential entrants, since it concluded that Procter & Gamble
was one of only a few likely entrants. 217 The test, therefore, appears to be
whether the potential entrant is one of the few most capable of challenging
the industry leaders.
C.

Market Structure-Need For Concentration

The fundamental rationale of the potential competition theory hinges
largely upon conditions within the target market. As stated in MarineBancorporation:
The potential-competition doctrine has meaning only as applied
to concentrated markets. That is, the doctrine comes into play
only where there are dominant participants in the target market
engaging in interdependent or parallel behavior and with the
capacity effectively to determine price and total output of goods or
services. If the target market performs as a competitive market in
traditional antitrust terms, the participants in the market will
have no occasion to fashion their behavior to take into account the
presence of a potential entrant. The present procompetitive effects that a perceived potential entrant may produce in an oligopolistic market will already have been accomplished if the target
market is performing competitively. Likewise, there would be no
need for concern about the prospect for long-term deconcentration of a market which is in fact genuinely competitive. 218
Having thus established the type of behavior which must exist in the target
market, the Court went on to conclude that the Government could estabfirms).
215. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
216. Id. at 581.
217. See also United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543
(N.D. Ill. 1968). "That tiny firms can still enter is insignificant in this context
because they do not constitute a significant competitive force.
Id. at 562.
218. 418 U.S. at 630-31.
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lish a prima facie case for the application of the potential competition
theory through concentration ratios. 1 9 If the concentration ratios were
unreliable indicators of the market's actual behavior, the burden was cast
22 0
upon the defendant to prove their unreliability.
Although under Marine Bancorporationthe Government presumably
can dispense with concentration ratios and simply produce direct evidence
of oligopolistic behavior in the target market, as a practical matter concentration ratios have been the linch-pin of the potential competition doctrine. Unfortunately, even though it is a key element of the doctrine, the
courts have not yet determined what level of concentration is needed to
establish a prima facie case.
The Department of Justice Merger Guidelines released May 30, 1968,
221
appear to suggest a cutoff at the 75%/eight-firm concentration level.
However, the guidelines are by no means conclusive, even as to the actions
of the Department of Justice, and the FTC has already challenged mergers
222
which clearly were not within the merger guidelines.
Although the courts have not yet developed a definite market share requirement, several decisions have cited favorably the Kaysen and Turner
definition of a "tight oligopoly" in evaluating whether a market was sufficiently concentrated to create a prima facie case of oligopolistic behavior. 223 According to their definition, a "tight oligopoly" is an industry
having "a very small number (eight or fewer) firms supplying 50 percent of
the market, with the largest firm having a 20 percent or higher share, and
with or without a fringe of small suppliers." 224 While for the most part the
decisions support the Kayser and Turner definition, 25 there is one exceptional case.
219.
220.

Id. at 631.
Id. In Marine Bancorporation the defendant failed to sustain the

burden of rebutting the presumption.
221. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, [1968] 1 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH)

222.

4,510 at 6,888.

See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir.

1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974) (4 firm 29.2%, 8 firm 39.7%).

223.

See Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 504 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.

denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973); Kennecott Copper Corp., 78 F.T.C. 744, 922,

[1970-73 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)

19,619 at 21,666 (1971),

aff'd, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974). See also
Warner-Lambert Co., 87 F.T.C. 812, 869, [1973-76 Transfer Binder] Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,141 at 21,016 (1976) (citing favorably Kaysen & Turner's

definition of "loose oligopoly.").
224.

C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLIcY 72 (1959).

225. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co., 87 F.T.C. 812, 867-68, [1973-76
Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,141 at 21,015-16 (1976) (8 firm
concentration ratio of 43.71% is not substantial); Sterling Drug, Inc., 80 F.T.C.
477, 596, [1970-73 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 19,961 at 21,978
(1972) (8 firm ratio of 48% only moderate concentration). But see United States
v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (8 firm concentra-

tion ratio of 58% held to be deconcentrated).
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In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 22 6 the Tenth Circuit upheld the
FTC's ruling that Kennecott's acquisition of Peabody Coal violated section
7. The court accepted the finding of the Commission that at the time of
the merger the industry, with an eight-firm concentration ratio of 39.7%,
was not a "tight oligopoly." 227 The court concluded, however, that evidence of the coal industry's rapidly increasing concentration was sufficient
reason to proscribe the merger. 228 If Kennecott is still good law, 229 the case
raises additional questions regarding the required level of concentration in
situations where the target market is moving towards a "tight oligopoly,"
as well as the definition of what constitutes a "trend towards concentration. ' 230 Unfortunately, few cases have considered these problems since
Kennecott .21
Once the Government has shown sufficient levels of concentration in
the target market to establish a prima facie case of oligopolistic behavior,
the burden is on the defendant to rebut the presumption by showing that,
in spite of its structure, the market is competitive. The only potential competition case to have dealt with this problem thus far is United States v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co. 23 2 In Black & Decker the eight-firm concentration ratio of ninety-six percent clearly created a prima facie case for the
application of the potential competition doctrine. With this established,
the court went on to examine several factors relevant to the issue of
whether the prima facie case had been rebutted. Among the factors considered were the recent entry of several new competitors; 23 3 the level of
226. 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974).
227. Id. at 73, 76.
228. Id. at 76.
229. Marine Bancorporationcasts some doubt upon the validity of Kennecott
in that Marine suggested that market concentration was a condition precedent to
application of the potential competition doctrine. 418 U.S. at 630-31.
230. In Kennecott, the market share of the top four firms had risen from
15.8% in 1954 to 29.2% in 1967, and the market share of the top eight increased
from 23.6% to 39.7% during the same period. The 160.5% increase for the top
firms accounted for 63% of the market expansion during this time period, thus
indicating that the sale of coal was being concentrated in a few hands. Id. at 73.
Though the market was not yet oligopolistic, the court concluded that when such
a trend is evident the potential competition theory is applicable. See also Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, [1968] 1 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4,510 at
6,884, which state that a trend towards concentration is a 7% increase in the
market share of any combination of the top eight firms over a five to ten-year
period prior to the merger.
231. The only other significant potential competition case to consider these
questions is Warner-Lambert Co., 87 F.T.C. 812, [1973-76 Transfer Binder]
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,141 (1976), where the Commission said that an
eight-firm concentration ratio of 43.71% was not sufficient in the absence of
evidence of a trend towards concentration. No such trend was found.
232. 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976). The leading case, however, is a horizontal merger case. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486
(1974).
233. 430 F. Supp. at 750-51.
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entry barriers;2 4 the expansion of production in response to growing demand; 3 1 the record of product innovation
and improvement within the
2
industry; 23 6 and price competitiveness. 17
Although the market manifested several indicia of a competitive
market, the court nonetheless concluded that the defendant had failed to
prove that the concentration ratios and structural analysis offered by the
Government "did not accurately depict the economic characteristics" of
the market. 21 8 This result is not too surprising when, as in Black & Decker,
the eight-firm concentration ratio is in the ninety-plus percentile bracket.
In such cases the burden of proof required to rebut the prima facie case
will undoubtedly be very formidable. Indeed, Professors Dunfee and Stern
suggest the following analysis: 23 9
Four Firm Ratio
Treatment
70%
Irrebuttable presumption of sufficient concentration.
50-70%
Rebuttable presumption of concentration.
under 50%
Rebuttable presumption of insufficient concentration.
Under this approach the Black & Decker court would not have had to consider the additional factors noted above, since the four-firm ratio was approximately eighty percent. As of yet, however, no court has adopted these
or other general guidelines.
D.

Size Of The Acquired Firm

In almost every potential competition case which has resulted in a
Government victory, the enterprise acquired was a leading firm in' the
target market. As discussed earlier, when a potential competitor enters the
target market through a large acquisition, the entry is unlikely to produce
any significant long term benefit to competition. If the entrant simply
steps into the acquired firm's shoes and sits tight, nothing is gained by the
entry. On the other hand, if the acquiring company merges with a leading
firm and thereafter undertakes an aggressive expansion of its market,
short term competition might be improved, but the entrenchment of the
acquired firm may adversely affect competition in the long run. Assuming
that the other requirements of a potential competition case are satisfied,
the acquisition of a dominant firm in the target market may substantially
lessen competition.
When the acquired firm is not a dominant firm in the industry, how234. Id. at 751-52.
235. Id. at 753.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 754.
238. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 631
(1974).
239.
Dunfee
& Stern,
supra
note
5, at 856.
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ever, there may be procompetitive effects engendered by the acquisition
which offset or diminish the injury to competition caused by the removal of
the acquiring firm as a potential entrant. Indeed, the toehold theory is
premised on the assumption that the acquisition and expansion of a small
firm within the target market may produce substantially the same procompetitive effects as a de novo entry. 240 Therefore, the acquisition of a
small firm may be permissible whereas the acquisition of a dominant firm
241
would not.
In The Budd Co.,242 the Commission converted the preceding reason-

ing into a rule of law. In that case the Commission held that the acquisition
of a toehold firm should normally be permitted and created a rebuttable
presumption of legality for toehold acquisitions. As a result, at least insofar as the Commission is concerned, the acquisition of a firm controlling
less than 10% of the market (in an industry where the top four firms
possess 60% or more of the market) will be presumed to be procompetitive
unless the Government can prove special circumstances which indicate
otherwise.
As one might suspect, however, the toehold defense is by no means settled law. Although Budd presumably would permit a company capable of
entering de novo to enter by acquisition of a toehold firm instead, in
United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co. ,243 the court rejected that approach. In essence the Phillips decision interprets section 7 as requiring
not only that the form of entry be procompetitive, but that it be the most
procompetitive form possible. To this end the court stated:
[F]oothold acquisitions cannot be looked upon with favor unless
...the potential entrant could not have achieved a substantial
market entry on a unilateral basis, perhaps supplemented
only by
244
incidental acquisitions of a de minimis nature.
This language in Phillips has rightly been criticized, 24 5 since taken
literally, Phillipswould hold any merger illegal where the acquisition of a
smaller firm would have been possible. Indeed, this de minimis test would
place potential entrants on essentially the same footing as an actual competitor. Whether a potential entrant will in fact ever enter the market is
always uncertain. Consequently, if the manner of entry offers some procompetitive potential, the courts should refrain from preventing such an
240.

The Bendix Cop., 77 F.T.C. 731, 817-20, [1970-73 Transfer Binder]

Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)

10,288 at 21,445-47 (1970), vacated and remanded on

other grounds, 450 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1971).
241. The Budd Co., 86 F.T.C. 1, [1973-76 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 20,998 (1975).
242. Id.
243. United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal.
1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
244. Id. at 1258.
245.

See Comment, The Budd Co.: The Toehold Defense to a Section 7 At-

tack, 71 Nw U.L. REv. 264, 279-80 (1976).
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entry where the chances of a slightly more competitive form of entry being
made are speculative. Moreover, where the competitive difference is
slight, there is no justification for depriving the acquired company of the
freedom to dispose of its assets as it may choose.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the law regarding potential competition is still in a state of
evolution, the following general principles have become fairly well established:
(1) The relevant market(s) must be defined both in terms of geographic and product dimensions.
(2) The acquiring company must either be perceived to be a probable
entrant, or actually be a probable entrant, by a more competitive
means such as internal expansion or toehold acquisition.
(3) Internal expansion or toehold acquisition must offer a substantial
likelihood of ultimately producing deconcentration in the target
market.
(4) In the case of perceived potential competition, and perhaps in the
case of actual potential competition, the acquiring company
must be one of the few most likely potential entrants capable of
challenging the industry leaders.
(5) The target market must be oligopolistic, or at least evidence a
strong tendency towards oligopoly.
(6) The acquired company must have been a significant competitive
factor in the target market.
Although the basic concepts of the potential competition theory have been
established, numerous questions remain unanswered. Undoubtedly the
most fundamental of these is whether the actual potential entrant theory is
in and of itself a sufficient ground for a section 7 violation. If this question
is answered in the affirmative, the courts must resolve the controversy over
the proper standard of proof, as well as the dispute over the need to show
that the merger will take place in the near future.
In addition to these basic conceptual problems, numerous practical
policy questions also remain unresolved. For example, the courts have not
yet firmly settled upon the concentration level needed to establish a prima
facie case, nor the maximum size of a toehold firm. These questions present substantial difficulties for the practitioner who must advise his client,
but it is unlikely that many of these problems will be resolved for many
years to come.
WILBUR L. TOMLINSON
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